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ABSTRACT
Software Risk Assessment based on UML models
Kalaivani Appukkutty

Risk is the possibility of suffering loss. Risks identified during the early stages of
software development are easier and cheaper to handle by making changes to the
software architecture. This thesis presents methodologies to assess software risk using
Unified Modeling Language (UML) specifications of the software from the early design
stages. We present methodologies to assess two types of software risk: Requirementsbased risk and Performance-based risk. In assessing requirements-based risk, each
requirement is mapped to a specific operational scenario in UML. The risk factor of a
scenario in a failure mode is obtained by combining the probability of failure of the
scenario and the severity of the failure. For the performance-based risk analysis, we use
UML diagrams with performance related annotations, build a software execution model
for each scenario and then map it to a system execution model using the deployment
information. For estimating the performance-based failures of each scenario we use an
asymptotic bounding analysis. The methodologies are applied on various case studies.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Risk is defined as a combination of two factors: probability of malfunctioning
(failure) and the consequence of malfunctioning (severity) [22]. Various measures are
taken to assess risk during software development in order to estimate the possible risks
that might occur and eliminate them by making relevant changes. Software risk is
assessed at various stages of software development and at various levels of software
architecture.
This thesis focuses on the assessment of two kinds of Risk: Requirements based
risk and Performance based risk.

1.1

Problem Statement
There is much ongoing research in the field of reliability, security and safety-

based risk assessment. Most of the current risk assessment methodologies can only be
used to estimate risk in the later stages of the software development life cycle, typically
from design models or code. As a result, these methodologies can identify risks but have
limited capability in preventing these risks from occurring. It is a known fact that it is
more feasible to make changes to the software system under development in the early
stages of the software development cycle. Risk assessment should therefore be performed
during the early stages of software development in order to avoid the high costs of
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modifying software at the later stages. Risks that are assessed closer to the release of
software are mostly infeasible to prevent, since making changes to software architecture,
design or code at that stage is very expensive. There is a need for a more efficient risk
analysis that follows a proactive approach, where the potential risks are identified during
the early phases of software development life cycle and preventive measures are taken to
avoid the risks from occurring.

1.2

Background and Previous work
Software risk assessment is a means to identify risky components and scenarios of

software during its development [11]. Risk assessment is done at different levels of
software and different stages of software development. Several formal methodologies
were introduced in the recent years to assess and deal with different kinds of risks
associated with software. Our risk assessment methodologies are based on UML
specifications.
1.2.1

The Unified Modeling Language
The Unified Modeling Language (UML) is a language for specifying,

constructing, visualizing, and documenting the artifacts of a software-intensive system
[3]. It was developed by OMG as a step towards integrating the best practices in the
industry to view the levels of abstraction, domains, architectures, life cycle stages and
implementation technologies. UML provides a formal method for modeling object
oriented software. It is language independent and it can be tailored to a specific domain.
UML provides several extensibility features to aid in building models in certain domains
as well as addressing certain modeling problems. A collection of such extensions that
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address a particular modeling problem or a problem domain can be grouped together to
form a UML profile. OMG has also introduced UML profile for performance,
schedulability and time specifications [11]. Most software projects today follow UML
modeling. UML modeling is used especially during the design stages of software,
therefore, risk assessment using UML models will aid in early identification of software
risk and hence modifications to software to prevent those risks can be performed early.
1.2.2

Requirements based risk related work
Gilliam et al introduced a method to reduce software security risk by identifying

the vulnerabilities of the software using Vmatrix (vulnerability matrix) and by
performing Property-Based Testing (PBT) [3]. The CORAS project [8] introduces modelbased risk assessment methodology for security-based risks using UML models.
A methodology to estimate risk at the architectural level using UML models is
introduced in [22]. Risk factors of components and connectors are estimated by
combining dynamic complexity and severity ranking of a failure. Further Component
Dependency Graphs (CDG) are developed to assess the risk of subsystems in a
hierarchical architecture. In [11] a similar approach is followed to obtain component and
connector risk factors and a Markov model is used to come up with scenario-level risk
and system-level risk factors. This approach also identifies critical components and
connectors in the system. Both these techniques are based on UML models and provide a
formal method to assess risk. These approaches need details of the components and
connectors involved which are not available until the later stages of the design phase.
Moreover, the approaches do not relate the risks to the requirements that will be affected,
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and because of this it would be difficult to communicate the risk assessment results to the
client.
Identifying requirements-based risk at an early stage is usually subjective and
needs a panel of domain experts to analyze the requirements. Currently available
techniques for assessing requirement-based risk are ad hoc in nature and are not based on
any popular modeling techniques. They are usually performed in an informal and
subjective way by a “risk team”. But in reality, not all the software projects have the
luxury of having a group of domain experts to carry out this analysis and such an
assessment is completely dependant on the opinion of the risk assessment team.
Risk analysis based on the impact on requirements has been previously addressed
by Feather et al [14] [21] in the form of defect detection and prevention. This approach
considers requirements and the various failure modes that occur as an obstruction in
satisfying the requirements. The impact of each failure mode on the requirements is
estimated by a group of domain experts and is represented using an impact matrix. A
cost matrix is then developed with a list of measures to be taken to prevent the failures
and their corresponding cost. The two matrices are then combined to find a balanced
solution for the cost of prevention measures and the risks involved. This is a completely
subjective approach and is performed at the requirement analysis stage. The analysis is
not based on any formal design models. The risk assessment is based on the opinions of
the members of the domain-expert team, who in most cases are not involved in the design
of the software.
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1.2.3

Performance based risk related work
Performance-based analysis measures risk in terms of the non-functional

performance attributes of the system and is estimated using the architectural level design
information from UML specifications. Several approaches have been presented in the last
few years that focus on embedding performance (and other non-functional properties)
information in UML software models using the UML extensions [26] [19].
A framework that allows UML diagrams to be used for building performance models is
presented in [12]. Performance modeling is carried out based on a precise textual
notation, called Performance Modeling Language, which represents the UML
characteristics relevant to performance models. These UML based performance models
are then transformed into stochastic queuing networks with simultaneous resource
possession. Queues are derived from Class Diagram, workload from Collaboration
Diagram, and service demands are partially derived from triggering properties of Class
Diagram. Merseguer et al [15] [16] presented an extension of the UML notation to
performance annotations (pa-UML), to embed performance related information in UML.
A framework that allows UML diagrams to be used for building performance models is
presented by Kahkipuro [12]. Dimitrov et.al [5] presented various kinds of UML
extensions that are used to annotate and embed performance aspects of various UML
diagrams. A UML-driven framework is presented and several interesting and useful
approaches of direct and expanded extensions to UML are presented, such as, load-andtime weighted use case diagrams, sequence and activity diagrams with time information,
state diagrams with transition probability and most importantly deployment diagrams
(which map the various software components to the system hardware platform). Smith
[23] [24] presented the conversion of various parameterizations of the execution graph
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with demand vectors, to convert it into an Execution Graph (EG). This is called the
Software Execution Model [23]. A more extensive approach has been introduced in [4],
where asynchronous communication patterns and concurrent action executions have also
been considered. The performance-based risk analysis presented in [27] defines the
performance failure on a scenario level and quantifies risk as a combination of the
probability failure and the severity of the failure. An asymptotic bounding analysis to
come up with the asymptotic bounds on throughput and response time of a scenario
(modeled by a software execution graph) bounding analysis is presented in [13].

1.3

Research objectives
The risk assessment methodologies presented in this thesis are motivated by the

need to:


Assess requirement-based risk of software during the early design phases of
development. It is important to identify the requirements that are at high risk
earlier in the software development since preventive measures can be taken
prior to the development of the software so as to reduce the occurrence of the
failure modes that contribute to requirement-risks.



Develop a formal methodology based on UML for requirement-based risk
assessment. Earlier requirement-based risk assessment techniques are based
on analyzing the requirement documents. UML provides a formal method for
modeling object oriented software. UML also provides several extensibility
features in the form of UML profiles to aid in building models in certain
domains as well as addressing certain modeling problems.
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Develop a requirement-risk assessment methodology that relies less heavily
on domain experts since, methods solely based on input from domain experts
are highly subjective and error prone.



Develop a methodology for performance based risk assessment that takes into
account the severity of performance failures and uses the stereotype and
annotation tags introduced in the UML profile for performance, schedulability
and time.

The contributions of this thesis are briefly described as follows:


We present a formal methodology to estimate requirement-based risk using
UML design specifications. The UML specifications are obtained in the early
phases of the software development. Our methodology relies lesser on domain
experts and therefore is less subjective and less error-prone. The technique to
estimate risk at the requirement level is based on previously established
formal metrics for estimating error proneness by Fenton et al [17] and severity
analysis techniques based on Function Failure Analysis (FFA).



We introduce a methodology for performance based risk assessment that
jointly takes into account the performance and the risk attributes on UML
software models. The risk factors that result from applying our methodology
to UML models incorporate the probability of violating a performance
requirement and the severity of the consequences. Therefore, on one hand,
they can be used to induce critical component refinements, and on the other
hand, to devise critical scenarios that may remain hidden in a pure
performance analysis.

The main contribution of this thesis towards this
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methodology is to assign demand vectors, add hardware platform
characteristics and perform stand alone analysis (step 1 and step 2 of the
methodology).

1.4

Thesis Outline
This Thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 deals with the steps in the requirements-based risk assessment
methodology and the illustration of the methodology on the cardiac pace maker
case study.
Chapter 3 explains the steps in the performance-based risk assessment
methodology and illustrates the methodology with the E-commerce case study.
Finally, Chapter 4 concludes with discussion about future work.
The Appendices show other case studies, on which the methodologies were
applied.
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Chapter 2
Requirements-based Risk Assessment
Software requirement risk is the possibility of suffering a loss of any functional or
non-functional requirement of the software system. This chapter presents our
methodology for requirements based risk assessment at the early design phase, using
UML models. Our method relies less heavily on domain experts than the currently used
methodologies [14] [21]. As a result, we obtain the risk factors associated with each
requirement.
2.1

Methodology for estimating requirements-based risk factors
A UML use case model is defined in the UML specifications [18] as a model that

describes a system’s functional requirements in terms of use-cases. We map requirements
to UML use cases and the use cases are realized by scenarios. Each scenario is modeled
by a sequence diagram, which shows the interaction of various components in that
scenario. According to pervious risk related work [22], Risk is a “Combination of two
factors: Probability of malfunctioning (failure) and the consequence of malfunctioning
(Severity).” The probability of malfunctioning of a system is proportional to its
complexity. The more complex a system is, the more it is prone to faults and failures.
Therefore, the complexity of a system is measured in order to come up with the
probability of its failure. Since the low level details of the components and connectors of
the system are not available during the early design phase, the complexity is calculated at
the scenario level, using UML sequence diagrams.
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Requirements are mapped to UML use cases. Each requirement contains one or
more scenarios, each of which is represented as a Sequence diagram. A sequence diagram
is defined as a diagram that shows the object interactions arranged in a time sequence
[18].
The steps of our requirement-risk assessment methodology are presented in
Figure 1.
STEP 1: Map the requirements to UML sequence diagrams
For each Sequence diagram
STEP 2: Construct the control flow graph of the
scenario from the sequence diagram
STEP 3: Identify the different failure modes on the
sequence diagram and the control flow graph
For each failure mode
STEP 4: Assess the severity class of the failure
mode using Function Failure Analysis (FFA)
STEP 5: Determine the cyclomatic complexity of
the sub-control flow graph
STEP 6: For the failure mode, measure the number
of messages exchanged between the components in
the sequence diagram.
STEP 7: Complexity of the scenario for the
failure mode is calculated as
Cyclomatic complexity * Number of messages
STEP 8: Risk of the scenario for the failure mode
is calculated as Complexity * Severity
End For each failure mode
End for each sequence diagram
Figure 1. Requirement risk assessment methodology

In STEP 1, we identify the use cases and the corresponding scenario and sequence
diagrams. In STEP 2, we construct a control flow graph from the sequence diagram. This
is fairly straightforward since the sequence diagram can be viewed as a control flow
diagram where the control flows from one component to another in the form of messages
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that trigger an action or event in the destination component. The control flow graph of the
scenario captures all this information in the form of nodes and control flow arcs. It gives
a sequential flow of control with the nodes representing different states of components
and the arcs representing the flow of control. This methodology has been published as [9]
and has been applied on an illustrative case study in [10].
A failure mode is based on how the scenario fails during execution. Failure Mode
Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) [6] defines a failure mode as the way in which
a product or process could fail to perform its desired function. A scenario could fail at
several places but we only consider the failure modes based on the scenario inputs or
outputs and not on the failure of individual components or connectors involved. In STEP
3, the failure modes of a scenario are identified and are marked on the sequence diagram
and the control flow graph. The severity (consequences) of each one of the failure modes
is assessed in STEP 4 using Functional Failure Analysis, where each failure mode is
analyzed by domain experts based on the effects of that failure mode. The failure mode is
then categorized into one of the four classes, based on its severity: Minor, Marginal,
Critical and Catastrophic. Severity indices assigned for each category of failure are 0.25,
0.50, 0.75 and 0.95 respectively. Our previous work in reliability-risk assessment also
uses a similar classification [11].
In STEP 5, we measure McCabe’s cyclomatic complexity (CC) of the sub control
flow graph that shows the flow of the scenario to the point where the relevant failure
mode occurs. CC is calculated as:
CC = E - N + 2
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Where E is the number of edges and N is the number of nodes in the graph considered. In
STEP 6, we count the number of messages (Msg) exchanged between the components
from the start to the point where the considered failure mode occurs. Earlier work in
software metrics by Fenton et al [17] shows that the product of the two metrics McCabe’s
cyclomatic complexity and sigFF is a good predictor of fault proneness. sigFF is the
count of new and modified signals exchanged between the various modules. “The
combined metrics appear to be better in terms of measuring complexity than both sigFF
and Cyclomatic complexity on their own and also better than the size metric” [17]. The
metric sigFF is analogous to Msg or the number of messages that are exchanged between
various components in the system. The complexity of the scenario for a specific failure
mode is calculated as the product of CC and Msg for that specific failure mode. By
combining these two metrics, we combine the complexity of the control flow of the
scenario and also, the number of interactions that take place between the different
components. Note that, while calculating the complexity, we do not go into the details of
each component but we take into account only the interactions between the various
components involved.
In STEP 8, the risk value of a scenario in a specific failure mode is calculated as a
product of the normalized complexity of the scenario in that failure mode and the
corresponding severity value. The process is repeated for each failure mode and for each
scenario. The results are tabulated in the requirement-risk matrix as shown in Table 1.
The first Column contains the requirements of the system (R1 through Rm). Each
requirement is realized using one or more scenarios. The second column shows the
scenarios that fulfill the requirements. Requirement R1 is realized by two scenarios S1
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and S2. Requirement R2 is realized by one scenario S3. The failure modes are represented
from column 3.
Failure Modes
Requirements

Scenarios

FM1

…

FMn

Rf

S1
R1

FM2

S2

R2

S3

…
Rm
Table 1. Requirement risk matrix
FM1 through FMn are the failure modes. The value Rf is the risk factor of
scenario S1 (that partially fulfills requirement R1) in failure mode FM2. We fill in values
for the cells only if the failure mode is relevant to a particular scenario. For example,
scenario S1 may fail only in failure mode FM2. In that case, we only fill the risk factor
for the cell corresponding to row S1 and column FM2 and leave the rest of the row of
scenario S1 blank. We only consider the mapping of one requirement to multiple
scenarios and not vice versa.
2.2

Case study: The Cardiac Pacemaker
The methodology is illustrated using the pacemaker example. This example was

used in the previous risk analysis methodologies presented in [22] and [11]. The
pacemaker is an implanted medical device for regulating the heart beat. The purpose of a
cardiac pacemaker is to stimulate the heart when there is a block in the heart or when the
heart rate is slow. The device listens to the heart's native electrical rhythm, and if it does
not sense any electrical activity within a certain time period, it stimulates the heart with a
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preset amount of energy, in the form of an electrical pulse. The listening phase is called
sensing and the stimulation is called pacing.
The pacemaker is a critical real-time application. An error in the software
operation of the device can cause loss of the patient's life. The basic requirements of this
device are to sense and pace the heart at the proper time and for a proper duration. Failure
to achieve these requirements can cause severe heart conditions. Therefore, this is an apt
case study for requirement risk analysis, using which we can assess the risk of each
requirement and modify the design and development process to reduce high risks.
The use case model of the Pacemaker, shown in Figure 2 shows the different
operating modes the Pacemaker works in and the external actors involved. The
pacemaker runs in either a programming mode or in one of the operational modes.
During programming, the programmer specifies the type of the operation mode in which
the device will work.

Figure 2. Use case view of the Pacemaker case study
14

The operation mode depends on whether the Atrium (A), Ventricle (V), or both
are being monitored or paced. The programmer also specifies whether the pacing is
inhibited (I), triggered (T), or dual (D). The various components of the pacemaker are as
follows: [22]
Reed_Switch (RS): A magnetically activated switch that must be closed before
programming the device. The switch is used to avoid accidental programming by electric
noise.
Coil_Driver (CD). Receives/sends pulses from/to the device programmer. These pulses
are counted and then interpreted as a bit of value zero or one. These bits are then grouped
into bytes and sent to the communication gnome.
Communication_Gnome (CG). Receives bytes from the coil driver, verifies these bytes as
commands, and sends the commands to the Ventricular and Atrial models. It sends
positive and negative acknowledgments to the coil driver to verify command processing.
Ventricular_Model (VT) and Atrial_Model (AR). These two components are similar in
operation. They both could pace the heart and/or sense heartbeats. Once the pacemaker is
programmed, the magnet is removed from the Reed_Switch. The Atrial_Model and
Ventricular_Model communicate together without further intervention. Only battery
decay or some medical maintenance reasons force reprogramming.
For illustration purposes, we have shown the methodology applied on the AVI
scenario. In this scenario, the Ventricular (VT) component senses the heart beat and when
the heart misses a pulse, it sends a signal to the Atrial (AR) component and the AR
component paces the heart. The sequence diagram for the AVI scenario is shown in
Figure 3.
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FM1
Msgs = 4

FM2
Msgs = 7

FM3
Msgs = 9

Figure 3. Sequence diagram for AVI scenario with failure modes and Msg values
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Start
A- ON
V- ON
A- AVI Mode

A- Refractory
V- Refractory

V- AVI Mode
T.O.

FM1
V- Waiting

A- Waiting

V- Sense
A- Waiting
V- Waiting
T.O.

V- Pacing

FM2

A- Pacing
T.O.

FM3

V- Refractory

A- Refractory

T.O.

V- Waiting

A- Waiting

Figure 4. Control flow diagram for AVI scenario with failure modes
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The possible failure modes (at the requirements level) for this scenario are: Heart
beat not sensed by the Ventricular component (FM1), Heart not paced by the Atrial
component (FM2), Heart is kept pacing i.e., pacing does not end (FM3). The Msg value
is counted for each of the failure mode. The failure modes and the corresponding Msg
values are also marked at the places where they occur in the sequence diagram in Figure
3.
The control flow diagram for the AVI scenario is shown in Figure 4. The places
where the three failure modes FM1, FM2 and FM3 occur are marked on the control flow
diagram. The cyclomatic complexity is measured from the control flow graph, for each
failure mode.
The complexity of the scenario in each failure mode is calculated. The complexity
of the AVI scenario is calculated as the product of CC and Msg values. The complexity is
normalized for use in the further calculation of risk. The calculation is shown in Table 2.
Failure
Modes

Cyclomatic
Complexity (CC)

Number of
Messages (Msg)

Complexity
(CC * Msg)

Normalized
Complexity

FM1

3

4

12

0.111

FM2

6

7

42

0.389

FM3

6

9

54

0.500

Table 2. Complexity of AVI scenario in the various failure modes

The severity of each failure mode is determined using Functional Failure Analysis
[2] [1], where each failure mode is analyzed by domain experts in coming up with the
effects of that failure mode. The result of FFA analysis is a table that shows the event that
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is associated with the failure, the kind of failure, the effects of the failure and its severity.
For example, the FFA table for the failure mode FM1 is shown in Table 3.
Scenario

Failure Mode


AVI

Heart not sensed
(FM1)



Effects
Severity
If a pulse is missed, the
Catastrophic
heart will not be paced
Might cost the life of the
patient

Table 3. FFA table for failure mode FM1
The numerical index for the severity class ‘Catastrophic’ is 0.95 [11]. Since all
the failure modes in the AVI scenario fall into the catastrophic severity category, their
severity value is 0.95. The risk factor for each failure mode in AVI scenario is calculated
as the product of the normalized complexity and its severity value.
2.3

Results
The result is in the form of the requirement risk matrix. The requirement risk

matrix shows the requirement risk associated with each failure mode for a given
requirement. For example the first row in the matrix shows requirement R1 and the
corresponding risk values for the various failure modes FM1, FM2 and FM3 associated
with it. This is shown in Table 4.

Failure Modes
Requirements

Scenarios

R1

FM1

FM2

FM3

AVI

0.11

0.37

0.475

R2

AAI

0.151

0.283

0.566

R3

Programming

FM4

FM5

0.017

0.233

Table 4. Requirement risk matrix for Pacemaker case study
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The failure modes FM1, FM2 and FM3 are common to the requirements R1 and
R2. Requirement R3 corresponds to the programming scenario, where the pacemaker is
programmed. The failure modes FM4 and FM5 are relevant to this requirement alone and
the severities of these failure modes are marginal. None of the failure modes involved fall
into the critical or minor categories. The failure modes FM4 and FM5 are not relevant for
the requirements R1 and R2. Therefore the corresponding cells are left blank. The blank
cells are “don’t cares”.
The requirement risk matrix gives the risk factor of each requirement in specific
failure modes. It is evident from the risk values that the requirements R1 and R2 are at
higher risk when compared to the requirement R3, as the risk values of R1 and R2 are
higher than that of R3 for the identified failure modes. Using this information, the
components that contribute in satisfying the requirements R1 and R2 can be given more
attention during development and can be rigorously tested.

Figure 5. Requirement risk values for Pacemaker case study
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The results are shown using a 3-D bar chart in Figure 5. Note that the bars are
colored according to their severity category. The results are shown for the scenarios
corresponding to the requirements R1, R2 and R3.
Note that the failure mode FM3 corresponding to requirements R1 and R2, is
more risky than FM1 and FM2. FM3 is the case that indicates that component AR keeps
pacing the heart. Practically, it certainly involves more risk when compared to missing a
pace (FM2) or failing to sense the heart beat (FM1).
The methodology was applied on a larger, more complex case study. The details
of the case study and the results are available in the Appendix.
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Chapter 3
Performance-based Risk Assessment
This chapter presents performance-based risk analysis. Performance is a
nonfunctional software attribute that plays an important role in application domains
ranging from safety-critical systems to e-commerce applications. We introduce the
concept of performance-based risk as risk resulting from the failure of scenarios to meet
the specified performance requirements. In particular we are interested in performance
attributes such as response time and throughput. Performance-based risk is defined as a
combination of the probability of violating a performance objective/requirement and the
severity of that violation.
We define performance failure as an unexpected performance result originated
from the violation of a non-functional requirement (or objective). Since performance
requirements are usually expressed in terms of time, a requirement violation is said to
occur when a certain operation takes too long to be completed. This type of failure
follows faults that concern system performance rather than system functionalities. For
example, the extra time taken for an operation to complete may have been spent in a
device that has been saturated due to the heavy system workload. Thus, even though the
software system is functionally correct, it may suffer from performance failures. In some
cases, these failures may have worse consequences than the functional failures. The
performance-based risk analysis is based on annotations of the UML diagrams that
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support such analysis. The methodology derives the software and hardware parameters
from the annotated UML sequence diagrams and deployment diagrams and provides the
values for performance-risk for a specified workload.
3.1

Methodology for Assessment of Performance Based Risk
Our methodology to estimate the risk factor depends on performance failures of a

software system modeled with UML diagrams. The risk model that we introduce
combines the probability and severity of performance failures, where such a failure
basically comes from a violation of a performance requirement. There are several
distinguished types of performance requirements. We focus only on time-related
requirements, that is, we only consider performance failures due to an excessively long
completion time of certain scenarios.
We assume that system scenarios (i.e., the sequences of actions that a software
system performs in order to react to an external trigger) are modeled using UML
Sequence Diagrams. Therefore, our observation point to estimate the probability of a
specific performance failure is a single Sequence Diagram. In order to estimate the
probability of such a performance failure (i.e., the completion time of the operation of the
scenario overcomes a required threshold), we build a model which takes into account the
time contribution of all the actions performed to complete the specific scenario.
Obviously, the estimate of the completion time of a scenario will not be given only from
a combination of time contributions of all the actions; the resource contention originated
from the system workload will be considered as well. The steps of our methodology for
assessment of performance-based risk are shown in Figure 6. Next, we present details of
the steps involved in the methodology.
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The contributions of this thesis to the performance-risk analysis methodology are
steps 1 and 2. All the other steps have been described shortly for the sake of
completeness. The details of this methodology is also available in [27].
3.1.1

STEP 1: Assign demand vectors and build a Software Execution Model
The Sequence Diagram presented in Figure 7 is annotated with

information related to the resources that each action/interaction needs in order to be
completed. There are two parameters defined for each action/step of a component:
CPU work _ units which contains work units as a relative measure of the CPU required to

perform this action and DISK data which contains the number of bytes that are read or
written to disk to perform this action.
INPUT: Performance objective. UML diagrams: Use case Diagram,
Sequence Diagram (SD), and Deployment Diagram.
For each Use Case
For each scenario
STEP 1 – Assign demand vector to each action/interaction
in Sequence Diagram; build a Software Execution Model
STEP 2 – Add hardware platform characteristics on the
Deployment Diagram; conduct stand-alone analysis
STEP 3 – Devise the workload parameters; build a System
Execution Model; conduct contention-based analysis
and estimate probability of failure as a violation of
a performance objective
STEP 4 – Conduct severity analysis and estimate severity
of performance failure for the scenario
STEP 5 – Estimate the performance risk of the scenario;
Identify high-risk components
OUTPUT:
Probability of performance-based risk of the scenarios.
Identification of performance-critical components.

Figure 6. Methodolgoy for assessment of performance-based risk
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The interaction/step of a connector is identified by the Interaction parameter, which
contains the size of data that is being transferred across that connector.
Extensions of UML to represent performance-related concepts have been
introduced and accepted by OMG as an UML adopted specification [25]. A step
represents an execution of some action.

C om ponent action (e xam ple: A1)
B

A

A1

A1 = [ C P U work_un its , D IS K d ata ]

C

C P U wo rk _ units: CP U wo rk u n its n e ed ed to
a cc omp lish th e a ctio n ta sk

1 : lb l1

D IS K da ta :

B1

3 : lb l3

= 0 – n o a cc ess to d isk

≠ 0 – size o f d a ta to b e a ccessed

2: lb l2
C1

Interaction ( e xam ple: 1 :lbl1 )

A2

lb l1 = [ M S G ]
MS G : size o f da ta exch an g ed in
th e in tera c tio n

Figure 7. Sequence diagram annotations

Each value in the demand vector represents the amount of a resource needed in a
unit that depends on the type of resource. Therefore, CPU demand is expressed in terms
of CPU work units, disk demand in terms of size of data to be accessed, and network
connection demand in terms of size of data to be exchanged. In the following
methodological steps we combine hardware device characteristics and demand vectors in
order to obtain uniform time-based demands.
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The second part of the step 1 is to translate the Sequence Diagram (SD) dynamics
into a flow graph. This graph, when parameterized with demand vectors, becomes an
Execution Graph (EG), which is a Software Execution Model [23]. Ideas on how to
translate sequence diagram patterns into execution graph patterns were first given in [25]
[29], even though all the potential patterns were not considered. A more extensive
approach was introduced in [25], including asynchronous communication patterns and
concurrent action executions. In case of the concurrent executions, only the longest
branch is considered for calculating the total demand or the total time taken for the
execution of the scenario. The longest branch is the branch of execution that has the
highest demand, that is, the branch that takes the longest time to execute. We consider
only this branch because the other concurrent branches finish executing before the
longest branch does.
3.1.2

STEP 2: Add hardware platform characteristics and conduct stand-alone
analysis
In order to translate a demand vector in the elapsed time, we need to know the

characteristics of the hardware platform where the software application will be executed.
For example, the same number of CPU work units may take a very different time
depending on the CPU speed.
In this step we get the hardware platform information from an annotated Deployment
Diagram. Thus, each deployment site in the Deployment Diagram is annotated with the
number and type of resources (i.e., devices) that it hosts. The annotated Deployment
Diagram in Figure 8 shows two servers, A and B, connected via LAN, and the clients, A,
B and C, connected to the servers via WAN. The site stereotype gives the set of devices
allocated on it. Server-A uses a processor of type CPU-1, Server-B uses a processor of
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type CPU-1, and in addition uses a disk of type Disk-1. Similarly, Client A uses a
processor of type CPU-2, and client B and C use a processor of type CPU-3.

Figure 8. Annotated deployment diagram

The service demands for each hardware device in time units Di are calculated as
follows. First, based on the software execution graph of the scenario, we calculate the
sum of demands for each hardware device in: work units for the CPUs, KBs for the disks
and networks. Then, we multiply these demands by the service times of the
corresponding hardware. Since our goal for performance-based risk analysis is to provide
conservative estimates, while calculating the completion time of a scenario we consider
those branches/paths/alternations which have higher service demands and ignore the
others.
The output of the Step 2 is a stand-alone analysis which evaluates the completion
time of the whole sequence diagram as it would be executed on a dedicated hardware
platform with a single user workload. This stand-alone analysis does not consider delays
due to contention for resources. Therefore, if the time value from the stand-alone analysis
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violates the performance objective, then the failure probability is equal to 1 without any
further investigation, that is, the software system has no feasible implementation under
the given set of requirements. Otherwise, it is worth investigating the system behavior
under the realistic workload in order to estimate the failure probability in the presence of
contention for resources.
3.1.3

STEP 3: Estimate probability of failure
In order to build the System Execution Model and conduct contention-based

analysis we first need to define the workload intensity in one of the following terms: the
arrival rate λ (for transaction workload), or the population N (for batch workload), and
think time Z (for terminal workload). We consider batch workload; hence, the workload
is parameterized by number of customers (population N) and the think time is assumed to
be zero1.
A complete system contention-based analysis is based on the parameterization of
a System Execution Model (typically a Queuing Network representing the hardware
platform topology) with values coming from the synthesis of the Software Execution
Model. The parameterized model can then be solved to obtain performance indices.
However, we are not interested in actually solving the performance model, but rather in
estimating lower and upper bounds on system throughput and response time for a given
scenario in order to estimate the performance failure probability. For example, equations
defining the asymptotic bounds on the system throughput X (N ) and response time

R (N ) with a batch workload of N customers are given by [13]:

1

Note that similar results can be derived for other types of workloads.
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N 1 
1

≤ X ( N ) ≤ min  ,
D
 D Dmax 
max ( D, N ⋅ Dmax ) ≤ R( N ) ≤ N ⋅ D

where N is the number of customers, D = ∑ Di is the sum of all demands in the scenario,
and Dmax is the maximum demand in that scenario.

Figure 9. Asymptotic bounds and failure probability estimate
Figure 9 shows a diagram of the asymptotic bounds on response time R(N) versus
the workload N (customers). The upper bound N ⋅ D is shown as the line marked with (o-). The lower bound is estimated as the maximum value of D, shown as line marked
with (-+-), and N ⋅ Dmax , shown as a line marked with (-*-). The values of the actual
response time must lie between these three lines. In Figure 9 3.4., we have also shown a 6
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seconds response time objective (parallel to x-axis) and a workload of 7 customers
(parallel to y-axis).
In order to estimate the probability of performance failure, we partition the
workload domain into three zones. In zone Z1 both upper and lower bounds on the
response time are below the performance objective, so the probability of failure is zero.
The failure probability in zone Z3 is 1 since both bounds fall over the performance
objective. In zone Z2 we estimate the failure probability as the ratio between the distance
of the upper bound from the performance objective (failure range) and the distance
between the bounds (whole range). This estimation approach can be summarized as
follows:
Failure probability (Z1) = 0
Failure probability (Z2) = (upper bound – performance objective) / (upper bound – lower bound)
Failure probability (Z3) = 1

3.1.4

STEP 4: Conduct severity analysis
Severity analysis is performed using Functional Failure Analysis (FFA), based on

UML use case Diagrams. FFA is performed on system-level sequence diagrams. The
system-level sequence diagrams show the system states, the actors involved, and the
input and output events. Note that the system-level sequence diagram of a scenario is
different from the component/connector-interaction sequence diagram. The internal
components and their interactions are not shown in the system-level sequence diagram.
We perform FFA using a subset of refined software HAZOP guidewords [20]. We
use the guidewords to analyze each event, to identify its possible failure modes, and the
way it contributes to hazards and accidents. The analysis considers each event and
decides whether or not hypothetical failure modes are credible and, if they are, what the
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consequences might be. For the consequences we use severity classification
recommended by MIL_STD_1629A : catastrophic, critical, marginal, and minor. The
output results of FFA analysis are recorded in a tabular form which, for each event in the
system-level sequence diagram, contains the guideword, failure mode, its effects, and its
severity. The details of estimating severity can be found in [2].
3.1.5

STEP 5: Estimate the performance risk and identify high-risk components
The performance risk of a scenario is defined as the product of two factors:

• The probability that the system will fail to meet the required performance objective
(e.g., desired response time), estimated in STEP 3, and
• The severity associated with this performance failure of the system in the scenario,
estimated in STEP 4.
In addition to estimating performance risk of a scenario (i.e., identifying high-risk
scenarios), our methodology helps in identifying a set of high-risk components that
should undergo more rigorous development, implementation, and testing. For this
purpose, we first estimate the overall residence time of each component in a given
scenario. In a case of a performance failure in a scenario, the component with the highest
residence time is the bottleneck component. Next, we normalize the component’s
residence time with the response time of the corresponding scenario. For a component
Ci in a scenario S j , the normalized residence time is given by

RCi in S j = Overall residence time of Ci in S j / Response time of Si .
The normalization enables us to compare the component’s residence times across
scenarios, that is, to identify high-risk components in a set of scenarios under
consideration.
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3.2

The E-commerce example

In this section we illustrate our performance-based risk assessment methodology
on an e-commerce application which allows customers and suppliers to interact with each
other over the Internet. In this type of applications long response times may easily lead
customer to change the supplier, with consequent damages such as loss of money and
market. Of course, the severity of performance failures (i.e., violations of performance
requirements) depends on the type of failure and usually is different for different types of
failures.
Shortly, the e-commerce system allows a customer to browse through the various
catalogs provided by the suppliers, select the item to be purchased, and place the order.
The order is validated by checking that the customer has a contract with the supplier and
one or more bank accounts through which payments can be made. The supplier checks
for the availability of the product, and if available, ships the product. After receiving the
product, the customer sends back an acknowledgement. Finally, the invoice is processed
by electronically transferring funds from the customer’s bank account to the supplier’s
bank account [7]. The Use case model of the e-commerce application is shown in Figure
10. In the remaining of this section we first apply stepwise the methodology introduced
on a given scenario, and then present the results for the other scenarios, including the
identification of the high-risk components.
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Process Delivery order

Browse Catalog

Confirm Shipment

Customer

Supplier

Place Requisition
Send Invoice

Bank

Confirm Delivery

Figure 10. The use case diagram of the e-commerce example

3.3

Applying the risk assessment methodology on the Place Requisition scenario

Step 1: Assign demand vectors and build a Software Execution Model

The Sequence Diagram for the Place Requisition scenario is shown in Figure 11.
Each action/step of components is identified by a local state (e.g., CI1, CA3, RA1, CTS1,
etc.). A demand vector is assigned to each action/interaction in Figure 11 (CPU work
units and the size of data to be written from/to a disk for each action of a component, i.e.,
the size of data to be sent across network for the interaction parameter of a connector).
The data that are read/written from/to the disk or sent across the network are
categorized on the basis of their sizes. The various data types involved and their sizes are
shown in Table 5. Scalar represents an acknowledgement or status message,
Queries/Requests are categorized into Simple, Average and Complex and the size of the
databases involved is given in terms of number of records.
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Figure 11. Sequence diagram for the Place Requisition scenario
Table 5. Data types and sizes
No. of
Simple Average Complex
No. of
No. of
No. of
No. of
Item/
Qy/Req Qy/Req Qy/Req Record Scalar Inventory Orders Customers catalogs Catalog
KB
KB
KB
KB
KB
Units
0.08
0.16
0.24
1
0.01
10000
50
500
1000
20
Size

The demand vectors assigned to each action/interaction in Place Requisition
sequence diagram presented in Figure 11 are given in Table 6. The interactions are
associated with the component actions that produce them. Since the actions RS1 and OS1
do not generate any interactions, the corresponding cells are left blank.
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Table 6. Annotations for Place Requisition sequence diagram
Component action
CI1
CA3
RA1
CTS1
RA2
OFS1
RA3
RS1
RA4
CA4
DOA1
OS1
CA5
CI3

CPUwork_units
(Work Units)
1
3
6
2.699
4
5.699
6
2
2
5
3
2
2
3

DISKdata
(KB)
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0

Customer Request
Requisition Request
Contract Query
Available Contracts
Reserve Funds
Funds Reserved
Requisition Data

MSG
(KB)
0.08
0.16
0.24
1
0.16
0.01
1

Requisition Status
Purchase Request
Order Data

0.01
0.24
1

Requisition Status
Requisition Output

0.01
1

Interaction

The Sequence Diagram for Place Requisition scenario shown in Figure 11 is
transformed (by applying the algorithm based on the translation principles illustrated in
Appendix) into the Execution Graph shown in Figure 12. Each rectangular node
represents a component action, including any interaction produced by it. The rationale
behind the translation is that each interaction in a Sequence Diagram is originated by a
certain amount of computation in the sending component. Therefore each interaction can
be translated into a basic block of an Execution Graph whose demand vector defines the
computational and memory load of the action (i.e. CPU and disk demands) as well as the
communication load of the interaction (i.e. network demand).
The first node in the Execution Graph denotes an expanded node PLACE-REQ
which represents the sequence of the following steps: CI1, CA3, RA1, CTS1, RA2, FS1,
and RA3. The triangular nodes represent the splitting branches (i.e., concurrent process
sequences that are executed at the same time). Note that the time taken for the execution
of the whole scenario does not include the time taken by each individual branch; rather,
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we consider only the longest path for calculating the total demand for that scenario [23].
In Figure 12, the path with the highest demand (i.e., the longest path) is shown in bold
and it forms the process sequence that takes the longest time and shows the highest
demand. We discard two branches (i.e., RS1 and the CA5, CI3 sequence) since, due to
their demands, they terminate earlier than the branch including RA4, CA4, DOA1, OS1.
Hence, for this particular scenario, we consider steps included in the expanded node
PLACE-REQ along with the steps RA4, CA4, DOA1, and OS1.
PLACE-REQ

SPLIT

RS1

RA4
CA4

SPLIT

CA5

DOA1

CI3

OS1

Figure 12. Execution graph for the Place Requisition scenario

Step 2: Add hardware platform characteristics on the Deployment Diagram and
conduct stand-alone analysis

The hardware platform is divided into several subsystems, which differ in
processing speed and disk accessing speed. These subsystems interact with each other
through different kinds of networks. The Deployment Diagram showing the different
subsystems and their communication links is given in Figure 13. Each subsystem
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contains a group of related components that reside in a single node, as described in Table
7.

<<CPU-1, DISK-1>>
CUSTOMER _SUBSYSTEM

<<CPU-2, DISK-2>>
SUPPLIER_SUBSYSTEM

<<network-WAN>> N1

<<network-LAN>> N2

<<CPU-3, DISK-3>>
REQUISITION _SUBSYSTEM

<<network-LAN>> N3

<<CPU-4, DISK-4>>
ORDERS_SUBSYSTEM

<<CPU-3, DISK-3>>
INVOICE_SUBSYSTEM

<<network-LAN>> N4

<<network-Secure >> N5

<<CPU-3, DISK-3>>
SHARED_DATABASES

<<CPU-5, DISK-5>>
BANK_SUBSYSTEM

Figure 13. Deployment diagram for the e-commerce system
Table 7. Mapping of components to nodes in the deployment diagram
Subsystem
node

List of
hosted
components

Customer

Supplier

Requisition

Orders

Customer
Agent (CA)

Supplier
Agent (SA)

Requisition
Agent (RA)

Customer
Interface (CI)

Supplier
Interface
(SI)

Requisition
Server (RS)

Delivery
Order
Agent
(DOA)

Customer
(external actor)

Orders
Server
(OS)

Supplier
(external
actor)

Invoice

Bank

Shared DB

Invoice
Agent
(IA)

Bank
Interface
(BI)

Contracts
Server (CS)

Invoice
Server
(IS)

Bank
(external
actor)

Operation
Funds Server
(OPS)

Account
Payable
Server
(APS)

The Deployment Diagram in Figure 13 shows the name and stereotype of each
node. The additional tags of the stereotype are represented between << >> symbols. This
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gives the type of CPU and disk type used for a particular node. The networks through
which these subsystems communicate are shown as devices with the stereotype of a
specific type of network. The communication between the components in the same
subsystem is termed as ‘Local’ interaction. The service times of the various CPUs, disks,
and networks are given in Table 8.
Table 8. Service times of the hardware platform devices
External
CPU1 CPU3 CPU4 Disk3 Disk4 LAN Network Local
Units µsec/WU µsec/WU µsec/WU µsec/KB µsec/KB µsec/KB µsec/KB µsec/KB
Service
10000
50
25
15
10
100 100000
1
time

Using the demand vectors given in Table 9, information presented in the
Deployment Diagram (Figure 13.), and the service times of hardware devices given in
Table 8, we estimate the completion time of the Place Requisition scenario. The total
demand for each device (in work units for CPUs and KB for disks and network devices)
is calculated by combining the demands of the steps in the scenario, excluding the steps
that appear in the branches that have been discarded from the Execution Graph of Figure
12 (discarded steps are shown as shaded rows in Table 9). These demands are then
multiplied by the corresponding service times given in Table 8 to obtain demands in time
units for each hardware device, shown in the last row in Table 9. The completion time of
the scenario is estimated as the sum of the demands in time units for all devices.
It follows that the completion time of the Place Requisition scenario is equal to
0.1326 seconds. If we assume as a realistic performance objective on this scenario a
response time of 1.5 seconds, then for a stand-alone analysis of the Place Requisition
scenario (considering the workload of a single customer), the performance objective is

38

satisfied. Hence, we proceed with building the system execution model that takes into
account the contention-based analysis and provides an estimate of the probability of
performance failure in a presence of a realistic workload.
Table 9. The demand vectors of the Place Requisition scenario
Processing
Step
Units
CI1
CA3
RA1
CTS1
RA2
OFS1
RA3
RS1
RA4
CA4
DOA1
OS1
CA5
CI3
Total demand
(WU or KB)
Total demand
(Di in µsec)

CPU1
WU

CPU3
WU

CPU4
WU

Disk3
KB

Disk4
KB

LAN
KB

1
3
6
2.699
4
5.699
6
0
2

External
Network Local
KB
KB
0.08
0.16

0.24
1
0.16
0.01

1
1

1
0
0.01
0.24

5
3
2

1
1

0
0
9

0
0
26.398

5

2

1

1.41

0.41

2.08

90000 1319.897

125

30

10

141

41000

2.08

Step 3: Devise the workload parameters; build a System Execution Model; conduct
contention-based analysis and estimate probability of failure as a violation of a
performance objective

Since the Place Requisition scenario passed the stand-alone analysis with respect
to the assumed performance objective, we move on to build a System Execution Model.
We estimate the probability of performance failure using the asymptotic bounds on the
response time derived from the queuing network that represents the system execution
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model.

Figure 14. The asymptotic bounds of the Place Requisition scenario

Assuming that the performance objective of 1.5 seconds response time must be
satisfied under a workload of 15 customers, we plot the graph for the asymptotic bounds
in Figure 14. For the considered workload the values of the upper and lower bounds are
2.0295 and 1.35, respectively. Since this workload falls in the zone Z2, as shown in the
Figure 14, the performance failure probability is calculated as follows:
Failure probability (Z2) = (upper bound – performance objective) / (upper bound – lower bound)
= (2.0295 – 1.5) / (2.0295 – 1.35) = 0.7792.
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Thus, the failure probability for the Place Requisition scenario (under the workload of 15
customers and 1.5 seconds performance objective for the response time) is equal to
0.7792.
Step 4: Conduct severity analysis and estimate the severity of a performance failure
for the scenario

We consider only the events that occur between the external factors and the
system. In this level of abstraction, the system is considered as a black box and the events
that occur among the software components of the system are not considered.

Figure 15. System level sequence diagram for Place Requisition scenario

The system level sequence diagram of the Place Requisition scenario in fig 11
shows the external events, CustomerInput and RequisitionOutput. These events are then
analyzed using FFA by applying the proposed guidewords. Since we are dealing with
performance-based risk, we apply only the guideword “LATE”.
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Results are shown in Table 10. We assign the worst failure mode severity from
the FFA table to the severity of a performance failure of the Place Requisition scenario.
Table 10. FFA table for Place Requisition scenario
SCENARIO
Place
Requisition

EVENT

GUIDEWORDS

FAILURE

Customer
input

Late

n/a

Request
output

Late

The confirmation
message for the
order placed
takes a long time
to be displayed to
the customer

EFFECTS

•

Customer’s time is
wasted.

•

The customer gets
impatient.

•

The customer
might cancel the
order.

•

The customer
might not order
again.

SEVERITY

Catastrophic

Step 5: Estimate the performance risk of the scenario; Identify high-risk
components

The performance risk of a scenario is estimated as a product of the probability that
the system fails to meet the required performance objective (i.e., desired response time)
and the severity associated with this performance failure of the system in this scenario.
We adopt a linear scale for the severity ranking, that is, we assign values 0.95, 0.75, 0.5,
and 0.25 to the catastrophic, critical, marginal, and minor severity classes, respectively
[22].
Let us consider the Place Requisition scenario. The probability of performance
failure estimated in step 3 is equal to 0.7792 and the severity associated with the
performance failure of this scenario is catastrophic, and therefore rated as 0.95. Hence,
the performance risk associated with Place Requisition scenario is equal to 0.74024.
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We also identify the critical components in each scenario by estimating the
normalized residence time of the components in that scenario. The components with high
residence time in a scenario are identified as the bottleneck components or the high risk
components. For the Place Requisition scenario, the component CA (Customer Agent)
has the highest normalized residence time. This includes the time taken by the component
for the process steps CA3 and CA4 (note that we do not consider CA5 since it has been
discarded). The normalized residence time of a component Ci in scenario S j is
calculated as:

RCi in S j = Overall residence time of Ci in S j / Response time of Si
The overall residence time of component CA in the place requisition scenario is
0.12 seconds and the response time of Place Requisition scenario is 0.1326. The
normalized residence time of CA is 0.12/0.1326 =0.905. This implies that 90.5% of total
time taken by the scenario is spent in the component CA.

3.4

Applying the risk assessment methodology on the other scenarios

Results given in Table 11 have been obtained upon applying the methodology to
the other scenarios of the e-commerce case study. The table shows the response time
objective in seconds, the workload in number of customers, the probability of failure, the
severity of the failure, and the calculated risk factor for each scenario.
Figure 16 shows the bar chart of the performance-based risk factors of all the scenarios in
the e-commerce case study. The color of each bar represents the severity associated with
the scenario.
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Table 11. Performance risk table for various scenarios of the e-commerce case study
Scenario

Response
time
objective

Workload

Probability Severity
of failure
value

Risk factor

Browse Catalog

1.5

11

0.6583

0.25

0.1646

Place Requisition

1.5

15

0.7792

0.95

0.74024

Process Delivery order

2

17

0.9145

0.5

0.4573

Confirm Shipment

3

29

0.3103

0.95

0.295

Confirm Delivery

1

24

0.4253

0.75

0.319

Send Invoice

0.08

35

0.2899

0.75

0.21743

Figure 16. Risk factors for the scenarios in the e-commerce case study

The identification of high-risk components is based on the estimated normalized
residence time. The graph in Figure 17 shows the components on the x-axis, scenarios on
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the y-axis, and the associated normalized residence times (1:100 scale) of the components
in the z-axis. The bars are colored according to the severity of the scenario. In each
scenario, the component with the highest residence time is a bottleneck.
To illustrate this concept, let us consider the Place Requisition scenario whose
sequence diagram is shown in Figure 11. The main source of performance failure in this
scenario is the Customer Agent (CA) component, which has the maximum residence time
in the scenario, as shown in Figure 17. This is due to the extensive usage of external
network by the component CA in that scenario, clearly seen from the demand vectors of
process steps CA3 and CA4 given in Table 9. Hence, the most cost effective way to
decrease the performance risk of the Place Requisition scenario is to reduce the residence
time of the CA component. Similarly, the component Supplier Agent (SA) has the
highest normalized residence time in the Confirm Shipment scenario which aslo has
catastrophic severity.
From, we can identify high-risk components for a particular scenario and the high
risk components across multiple scenarios. Of course, this information is valuable for
managing the performance-based risk. Thus, as shown in Figure 17, the component CA
(Customer Agent) has very high residence time in two scenarios (Place Requisition and
Confirm Shipment) and a moderately high residence time in one scenario (Browse
Catalog). Similarly, the component SA (Supplier Agent) has very high residence time in
the Confirm Shipment scenario and a moderately high residence time in the Process
Delivery scenario. By identifying components that are critical in more than one scenario,
risk management efforts could be properly distributed by prioritizing the components that
need to be improved.
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Figure 17. Residence time of the components in various scenarios

Similarly, the component SA (Supplier Agent) has a very high residence time in the
Confirm Shipment scenario and a moderately high residence time in the Process Delivery
scenario. By identifying components that are critical in more than one scenario, risk
management efforts could be properly distributed by prioritizing the components that
need to be improved.
The methodology was applied on a larger, more complex case study. The details
of the case study and the results are available in the Appendix.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented methodologies to estimate requirements-based risk and
performance-based risk using UML specifications. The requirements-based risk
assessment technique presents a systematic process to assess requirements based risk
with lesser input from the domain experts. It fills the gap between completely domainexpert dependant methods that are applied at the requirement analysis stage and formal
analytical methods that do not assess risk at the requirements level and also require low
level implementation details of the components involved. The methodology can be
applied during the early phase of software development based on high level design
specifications.
The rationale behind the performance-based risk assessment methodology is that
performance analysis may not be sufficient in some application domains, like safetycritical systems. A performance failure may or may not cause heavy consequences
depending on the severity of the failure. Our methodology annotates UML diagrams with
risk related attributes, and translates these diagrams into models that are ready to be
evaluated. The methodology highlights the key scenarios in the whole software/hardware
system and the bottleneck components in the scenarios which have the higher service
demands. This is an important feedback for software designers, that (based on this
information) may devise more effort to the design and the implementation (or to the
acquisition, in case of COTS) of the most critical components. Since the methodology
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does not rely on solving performance models, rather on the evaluation of formulas
representing the lower and upper bounds, as well as failure probabilities, its scalability is
not an issue.
This work is part of a longer project on which we are working to define a general
framework for risk analysis. In the near future we also plan to integrate requirementsbased and performance-based risk analysis approaches, and to build a XML-based tool
that allows annotating UML diagrams and automatically producing and evaluating risk
models. XML technologies have enhanced the potential for interoperability, thus we are
confident that in a medium-term view a wider integration of tools for non-functional and
functional analysis of UML models can be achieved based on XML.
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APPENDIX
Requirements-based Risk Assessment: Thermal Control System

The Requirements-based risk assessment methodology was applied to a The
Thermal Control System (TCS), which is a part of a complex, mission critical real time
system.
Figure 18 gives the use case model of the TCS. The use cases “Setting_1” to
“Setting_5” are the different modes the system could be set to work in. These are grouped
into a single use case “Mode Setting”. The use cases “Pump_1_Retry”, “Pump_2_Retry”
and “Retry_Both_Pumps” are used during an attempt to recover from failure. The
“Monitoring” use case involves monitoring if the system works well in any mode that it
is set to work in and in case of any failures, recover from it.

Valve_1

Pump_2

Valve_2

Operator

Pump_1
<<extend>>

0.05

0.95

Mode_setting

Monitoring

<<extend>>

<<extend>>

Setting_1

<<extend>>

<<extend>>

<<extend>>

<<extend>>

<<extend>>

<<extend>>
<<extend>>

<<extend>>

Retry_Both_Pumps

Failure_Recovery
<<extend>>

Setting_2

<<extend>>

<<extend>>

Pump_2_Retry

Setting_3
Setting_4

Setting_5

Pump_1_Retry

Figure 18. The use case diagram of the Thermal Contrl System
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The pumps and valves involved in the system are shown as actors since they are
considered external to the software that controls and monitors them. The Sequence
diagram and control flow graph of Retry Both Pumps scenario are shown in
SCITCS

PFMC_LT

FRITCS

PFMC_MT

RPCM_MT

RPCM_LT

FM1
Msg = 1

LT Failed

FF00

MT_Failed

Pump_Retry
Open_Switch

FF00

State_Open

Open_Switch

FF00

State_Open

Close_Switch

State_Close

FM2
Msg = 6

Pump_Retry

FF00

Retry_Success

State_Retry

0F00
MT_Retry_Success

MT_Operating

Pump_Retry(pump..)

Operating

FM3
Msg = 11

Pump_Retry

0F00

State_Retry
Startup
Retry_Success

LT_Retry_Success
LT_Operating

0000

Operating

Figure 19 and Figure 20 respectively. This scenario fails in three different failure modes
FM1, FM2 and FM3. The failure modes are marked on the sequence diagram as well as
the control flow graph. The Msg and CC values for the corresponding failure modes are
also noted in the figures.
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SCITCS

PFMC_LT

FRITCS

PFMC_MT

RPCM_MT

RPCM_LT

FM1
Msg = 1

LT Failed

FF00

MT_Failed

Pump_Retry
Open_Switch

FF00

State_Open

Open_Switch

FF00

State_Open

Close_Switch

State_Close

FM2
Msg = 6

Pump_Retry

FF00

Retry_Success

State_Retry

0F00
MT_Retry_Success

MT_Operating

Pump_Retry(pump..)

Operating
Pump_Retry

0F00

State_Retry
Startup
Retry_Success

LT_Retry_Success
LT_Operating

0000

Operating

Figure 19. Sequence diagram for Retry_Both_Pumps scenario
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FM3
Msg = 11

FM1
CC= 1

MT-Fail

LT-Fail

SCITCS
Dual Mode
Pump-Retry

FRITCS Mode
FF00
FRITCS FF00
Retry LT-Switch

Closed
LT-Switch

FRITCS FF00
Retry MT-Switch

Open
LT-Switch

Closed
MT-Switch
Open
LT-Switch

Closed
LT-Switch

FRITCS FF00
Retry MT-Pump

FM2
CC= 2

Retry
MT-Pump
MT-Pump
Retry-Success
SCITCS
Dual Mode
MT-Success

FRITCS
Dual 0F00

SCITCS
Dual Mode
Retry LT

FRITCS 0F00
Retry LT-Pump

MT-Pump
Operating

FM3
CC= 5

LT-Pump
Retry
LT-Pump
Retry-Success
FRITCS 0000

LT-Pump
Operating

Figure 20. Control flow graph of Retry_Both_Pumps scenario
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The Function Failure Analysis(FFA) table in Table 12 shows the effects and
severity of failure mode FM1 in Retry_both_Pumps scenario.
Table 12. FFA table for Retry_Both_Pumps scenario
Scenario

Failure Mode


Retry_both
_Pumps

Pump Failure is
not reported
(FM1)



Effects
Severity
Failure-recovery measures are not
Catastrophic
taken
Temperature
not
controlled.
(Mission Loss)

The complexity corresponding to each failure mode in this scenario is calculated
based on the Msg and CC values. This is shown in Table 13.
Table 13. Complexity for Retry_Both_Pumps scenario
Failure
Modes

Cyclomatic
Complexity (CC)

Number of
Messages (Msg)

Complexity
(CC * Msg)

Normalized
Complexity

FM1

1

1

1

0.015

FM2

2

6

12

0.176

FM3

5

11

55

0.808

Requirement

Table 14. Requirement risk matrix for Thermal Control System

R1

Failure Modes
Scenarios
FM1

Retry_Both_

FM2

FM3

FM4

FM5

FM6

FM7

FM8

0.015 0.132 0.202

Pumps
R2

Pump_1_Retry

R3

Setting_1

0.059 0.441
0.013 0.0525 0.434
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Table 14 gives the Requirement risk matrix for the TCS case study based on the
key scenarios Retry_Both_Pumps, Pump_1_Retry and Setting_1. No two scenarios in
this case fail in the same failure mode. Therefore, the other cells in the matrix are left
blank.

Figure 21. Requirement risk graph for Thermal Control System

Figure 21 is a graphical representation of the requirement risk matrix. The risk
bars are colored according to the severity of the failure modes.

Performance-based Risk Assessment: Earth Observing System

NASA’s Earth Observing System (EOS) is the first observing system to offer
integrated measurements of the Earth's processes. It is composed of a series of satellites,
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a science component, and a data system supporting a coordinated series of polar-orbiting
and low inclination satellites for long-term global observations of the land surface,
biosphere, solid earth, atmosphere, and oceans. It is a large scale, geographically
distributed data intensive system designed to handle terabytes/day of data.
The Flight Operations Segment (FOS) is a significant subsystem of the EOS. The
FOS is responsible for the planning, scheduling, commanding, and monitoring of the
spacecraft and the instruments on board. We applied our methodology on the
commanding subsystem, which by itself is a large real time system. The commanding
system is responsible for transmission of commands from the ground station to the
satellite. It also manages the queuing of multiple commands or command groups, proper
execution and maintenance of logs.
Figure 22 gives the use case model of the EOS-commanding system. The ground
operator and the space craft are shown as external actors. Our methodology was applied
on a combination of two scenarios: “Preplanned emergency command transmission”
scenario and “Handle transmission failure” scenario. Any exceptions occurring in the
space craft is to be handled by executing certain sets of commands or command groups.
The commands to handle some expected or preplanned exceptions are stored in a
database. In the Preplanned emergency command transmission scenario, such exceptions
are analyzed and the commands to handle these exceptions are retrieved from the
database and are sent back to the space craft. If the transmission fails, the Handle
transmission failure scenario is executed. The retransmission can occur at most twice. We
have considered a combination of the two scenarios in assessing the performance-based
risk of the commanding subsystem.
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EOS- Commanding system

Handl e T ransmi ssion Failure

<<incl ude>>

Operator

<<incl ude>>

T ransm it Real tim e Com mand

T ransm it Emergency com mand

Figure 22. Use case view of EOS-commanding system
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Space Craft

P re p l a n n e d e m e rg e n c y C o m m a n d T ra n sm i ssi o n

EOC

< < d a ta b a se > >

IC C

< < a c to r> >

T ra n sm i t t e r

ID B

S p a c e C ra f t

EO C1
1 : Ip e
IC C 1
2 : Q is

ID B 1
3: Rp
IC C 2
4 : Ris
EO C2
5 : Rc g
IC C 3
6 : S cg
EO C3
7 : Tcg
T 1
8: Upc
T 2
9: Cs
EO C4

Figure 23. Sequence diagram for Preplanned emergency command transmission
scenario

Figure 23 and Figure 24 show the sequence diagram for the Preplanned emergency
command transmission scenario and the Handle transmission failure scenario with the
actions and interactions annotated.
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H a n d l e T ra n sm i ssi o n fa i l u re

< < a cto r> >

R e ce i v e r

EOC

S ta tu s E v a l u a to r

T ra n sm i ssio n C o un t er

T ra n sm i tte r

S p ace C ra f t

1 : Cts
R1
2 : S rn
E O C5
3 : Ise
SE1
4: Se
E O C6
5 : Itc
T C1
6 : R e /R d
E O C7
7 : Rt
T1
8 : Up c

Figure 24. Sequence diagram for Handle transmission failure scenario

The execution graph derived from the sequence diagrams is shown in Figure 25.
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EOC1

ICC1

IDB1

Transmit Preplanned
Command

2

Retransmit On Failure

R1

ICC2

EOC5

EOC2

SE1

ICC3

EOC6

EOC3

TC1

T1

EOC7

T2

T1

EOC4

Figure 25. Execution graph for Transmit preplanned command and Retransmit scenarios
Figure 26 shows the deployment diagram of hardware resources involved in the
EOS Commanding subsystem. The figure shows the networks, processors and the
databases involved in the system with their corresponding speeds.
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S p ac e C ra f t

< < n e t w o rk(2 5 0 0 0 m i c ro se c / K B )> >
E CO M

< < CP U (0 .0 2 m i cr os e c/ K B )> >
C o m m u n i c a t i o n S u b sy st e m

< < ne t w o r k(8 0 m i c ro se c / K B )> >
G ro u n d N e t w o rk

< < d a t a b a se (6 0 m i c ro se c / K B )> >
ID B
< < CP U (0 .0 0 25 m ic ro se c /K B )> >
EOC
< < C P U (0 . 0 0 2 5 m i c ro se c / K B )> >
IC C

Figure 26. Deployment diagram for EOS commanding system

Table 15. Software units for EOS commanding system

Units
Size

Scalar
KB

Average Qy Complex Qy Simple Record Average Record Complex Record
KB
KB
KB
KB
KB
0.005
0.3
0.5
100
1000
10000

Table 16. Hardware units for EOS commanding system
EOC
ICC
Comm Subsystem
IDB
Ground n/w Emergency n/w
microsec/KB microsec/KB
microsec/KB
microsec/KB microsec/KB
microsec/KB
Units
0.0025
0.0025
0.02
60
80
25000
Service time

Table 15 shows the software units classified according to their type and size.
Table 16 gives the hardware units from the annotations in the deployment diagram.
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Table 17. Resource requirements for Preplanned emergency scenario
Processing Step EOC
Units
job
EOC1
ICC1
IDB1
ICC2
EOC2
ICC3
EOC3
T1
T2
EOC4

ICC
job

Comm Subsystem
Job

IDB
Job

5
8
7
5
10
8
7
6
3

Ground n/w
job

Emergency n/w
byte

0.005
0.5
10000
10000
0.3
10000
100
100
0.005

5

Table 18. Resource requirements for Transmission failure scenario
Processing Step EOC
Units
job

R1
EOC5
SE1
EOC6
TC1
EOC7
T1

ICC
job

Comm Subsystem
Job

3

IDB

Ground n/w

Emergency n/w

100
0.005
100
0.005
0.005
0.005

5
4
5
2
3
6

100

Table 17 and Table 18 give the resource requirements or demand vectors for the process
steps involved in the two scenarios considered.
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Figure 27. Asymptotic bounds and failure probability estimate

Figure 27 shows the asymptotic bounds on response time for the above discussed
scenarios. The failure probability is calculated as 0.7958 based on a workload of 2
requests per second and a performance objective of 15 seconds. The severity of this
failure is assessed as catastrophic. The risk factor of this scenario is 0.756.
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Identification of High-Risk Com ponents

Normalised Service Times

0.8
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0.4
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RECV

SE

TXC
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IDB

GN
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Com ponents

Figure 28. Identification of high-risk components
Figure 28 shows the high risk or the critical components involved in the
preplanned emergency scenario and the handle transmission failure scenario. Ground
(GN) and the Space (ECOM) networks are the most critical components. The service
times of the other components are significantly smaller than the service times of GN and
ECOM network components and hence are not visible on the graph.
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